Beginning in the mid-2000s, the incidence of drug shortages rose, especially for generic injectable drugs such as anesthetics and chemotherapy treatments. We examine whether reimbursement changes contributed to the shortages, focusing on a reduction in Medicare Part B reimbursement to providers for drugs. We hypothesize that lower reimbursement put downward pressure on manufacturers' prices which reduced manufacturers' incentives to invest in capacity, reliability, and new launches. We show that, after the policy change, shortages rose more for drugs with (i) higher shares of patients insured by Medicare, (ii) greater decreases in provider reimbursement, and (iii) greater decreases in manufacturer prices.
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Beginning in the mid-2000s, the incidence of drug shortages rose, especially for generic injectable drugs (Figure 1 ). Examples include drugs used in chemotherapy, antibiotics and anesthesia, as well as injectable electrolytes and vitamins. Shortages cause doctors and patients to seek alternatives that are unfamiliar or inferior. When substitutes are unacceptable, doctors and patients delay or forego treatment.
1 Most of the drugs that experienced shortages were off-patent and had previously been readily available. We investigate how declining reimbursement affected the rise of shortages of sterile injectable drugs in the United States. One such change was the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) which reduced Medicare reimbursement to the health care providers who administer these drugs. 3 We begin by specifying a theoretical model of how reimbursement policy and market size influence shortages. Our model implies that the decision by manufacturers to invest in reliability and quality depends on the expected returns. 4 If the returns are sufficiently high, then manufacturers will 1 Metzger, Billett and Link (2012) provide clinical evidence that a commonly used substitute (cyclophosphamide) used because of shortages of mechlorethamine resulted in higher relapse rates in patients with pediatric Hodgkin's lymphoma. The American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO), the American Society of Hematology (ASH), and the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) have all separately detailed how drug shortages result in worse patient outcomes, higher medical care costs, and delays in clinical trials for new therapies (American Society of Clinical Oncology (2011), American Society of Hematology (2011), American Society of Anesthesiologists (2010)).
2 See Kaakeh et al. (2011) regarding the incidence of shortages. See Panel (2009); Rosoff et al. (2012) regarding guidelines for dealing with shortages. See working papers by Conti and Berndt (2013) and Ridley, Bei and Liebman (2016) regarding shortages of cancer drugs and vaccines, respectively.
3 Duggan and Scott Morton (2010) examine the effect of the MMA on prices in the retail market. Furthermore, Jacobson et al. (2010) examine the effect of the MMA on treatment patterns by oncologists. 4 See also Woodcock and Wosinska (2012) 2 double-source ingredients, perform monitoring and maintenance on manufacturing lines, and build newer or more robust manufacturing lines. These actions can reduce the likelihood of shortages.
Consistent with the theoretical model, the empirical results suggest supply-side responses to decreasing margins. We begin by showing that drugs which had greater exposure to the policy change experienced greater increases in shortages. Exposure to the policy change is measured using the Medicare market share (MMS) -the fraction of a drug's revenue that comes from Medicare fee for service patients. This metric is similar to the Medicare market share measure used by Duggan and Scott Morton (2010) who study the effect of introducing Medicare Part D. Then, to explore our theorized mechanisms by which the policy change could lead to more shortages, we test comparative statics from the theoretical model. In particular, we show that drugs for which reimbursements fell by more after the policy change had greater increases in shortages. These results hold whether measuring reimbursement from Medicare to health providers (which was directly affected by the policy, but an indirect measure of manufacturer profitability) or a manufacturers' average revenue per dose (which was indirectly affect by the policy, but a direct measure of manufacturer profitability).
These relationships are quantitatively important. We estimate that a sterile injectable drug which has 10% less Medicare market share would have .66 fewer expected shortages days per year after the policy change, from a mean of 60. Likewise, a 10% drop in reimbursements to providers would increase the number of expected shortage days by 2.8 per year. The median drop in reimbursement from Medicare to providers for generic sterile injectable drugs after the policy change is roughly 50%.
Background
The pharmaceutical industry is highly regulated. A manufacturer must receive approval by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before being allowed to produce a generic pharmaceutical. To be approved, the manufacturer must persuade the FDA that its generic drug is pharmaceutically equivalent to the branded drug and that the manufacturing process follows good manufacturing practices including ensuring sterility for injectable dosage forms (Scott Morton, 1999) . Entry into branded drugs is also highly regulated, requiring a new molecule to demonstrate efficacy and safety compared to a placebo.
Sterile injectable drugs are typically administered in a clinical setting, such as a physician's office or in a hospital. In the U.S. a typical generic sterile injectable drug is produced by three to four of the seven big generic injectable manufacturers. 5 Sterility is critical for injectable drugs because they are administered intravenously, intramuscularly, or subcutaneously rather than passing through the gastrointestinal tract. Manufacturing lines can be contaminated by bacteria, fungus, or mold which causes delays to clean up the problem. In some cases, remediation is so costly relative to expected profit that the manufacturer stops producing the drug. Shortages might also occur due to disruptions to supplies of active pharmaceutical ingredients. Once one manufacturer stops producing, it falls to the other manufacturers to make up the supply difference. However, the other manufacturers might not find it profitable to produce more units of the drug, or might not be licensed to produce more of the drug, or might have been affected by the same supply shock as the other manufacturer. According to our IMS Health data sample which we detail later, injectable drugs totaled $83.3 billion dollars and 3.7 billion units in 2010.
The supply chain for a typical sterile injectable drug is illustrated in Figure 2 . Consider a Medicare-eligible patient being treated for cancer. She visits her provider who administers a drug through injection or infusion. The provider paid the price of the drug to a manufacturer (through a wholesaler). The provider is reimbursed by Medicare for the drug. The difference between the amount that Medicare reimburses for the drug and the manufacturer's price is the gross margin for the provider. 6 Henceforth, "manufacturer's price" will refer to a payment from a provider to a manufacturer (through a wholesaler), while "reimbursement" will refer to a payment from Medicare or a private insurer to a provider. eral, 2005) . The change resulted in decreases on the order of 50% of reimbursements for these drugs to providers as seen in Figure 3 . Furthermore the policy change clearly affected the level of reimbursements paid by Medicare as shown in Figure 4 . There is a clear drop in revenue paid by Medicare in 2005, followed by below private growth in Medicare reimbursements. The ASP regime is not a government price control, but rather cost-based reimbursement, however it resulted in much less generous reimbursements than the previous AWP regime. 8 The reimbursement change only directly affected Medicare fee-for-service. Private insurance and Medicare Advantage, which is administered by private insurers, were not directly affected.
Reimbursement Changes
Enrollment in Medicare Advantage grew during the sample period from 13 percent of Medicare 7 AWP was jokingly referred to as "Ain't What's Paid" (Mullen, 2007) . 8 The fact that ASP is based on two quarters previous introduces some rigidity into the price mechanism which likely doesn't help alleviate shortages. However, ASPs frequently rise by more than 6% from quarter to quarter in the data, so we conclude that this aspect of the switch to ASP is second order compared to the decrease in the realized levels of reimbursements. enrollees in 2005 to 27 percent in 2012. However, it is quite common for private insurers to mimic Medicare reimbursement, albeit with a lag (Clemens and Gottlieb, 2013) . Indeed, in 2007, 21%
of surveyed private payers planned to mimic ASP, while 76% intended to use rates above ASP or not use ASP (Mullen, 2007) . In 2012, seven years after the change to ASP by Medicare, private insurers were using ASP for 55% of patients, according to a survey (Magellan Rx Management, 2013 Advantage grew in our sample period which would create a counter-vailing effect except that private insurers gradually followed the lead of Medicare to ASP pricing.
Another policy affected reimbursement during the sample period. The Medicaid 340b program requires that drug manufacturers offer discounts to outpatient facilities that can be classified as "safety-net providers" for low-income patients. The number of drugs purchased through 340b covered entities grew during the period. Because these drugs are offered at a discount, the growth implies lower revenue for drug manufacturers. 9 While our estimates do not isolate the effect of reduced incentives because of 340b, the mechanism at work -reduced incentives because of policies that lower payments to manufacturers -is the same. However, drug purchases under the 340B
Program account for about 2 percent of all U.S. drug purchases (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013, 311).
Surplus for Providers and Manufacturers
Because of the elevated reimbursement levels, prior to the policy change, both providers and manufacturers could capture (short-run) surplus. For example, as much as half of an oncologists' income may have come from the surplus on drugs. Likewise, branded manufacturers charged 9 Occasionally, large price increases for generic drugs make the news. Price increases tend to occur when manufacturers have market power due to exits or acquisitions. Our model (section 2) predicts higher generic prices when there are fewer manufacturers. However, these cases of large price increases for generics are rare. According to Janine Burkett of pharmacy benefits manager Express Scripts, "Price inflation among a few generic drugs has been in the news lately," but the "Express Scripts Prescription Price Index shows that, since 2008, the average price of brand drugs has almost doubled, while the average price of generic drugs has been cut roughly in half" (Burkett, 2014) . 8 prices considerably higher than marginal costs. Even generic manufacturers can charge prices above marginal costs if fixed costs are large (some sterile injectable manufacturing requires costly facilities), products are not identical (due to reputation, availability, and relationships), or long-run equilibrium has not been reached.
MMA caused providers to be reimbursed less. Furthermore, the reimbursement change compressed the scope of price differentiation for manufacturers. With Medicare reimbursing at a 6 percent markup on average price, providers that paid a 7 percent markup on average price would lose money with each purchase. Hence, both manufacturers and providers likely lost surplus. This is consistent with previous research on vertical relationships suggesting that large firms on each side of the market share the surplus (Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; Grennan, 2013; Ho and Lee, 2015) . Through this channel, the decreased reimbursements to providers would reduced the prices manufacturer's receive as well. We investigate the relationship between provider reimbursement and manufacturer price.
Theory
We use a model of entry and capacity choice with supply uncertainty to illustrate the change in production incentives and underlying welfare economics associated with changing Medicare reimbursement. This class of models has been studied by Carlton (1978) , Deneckere and Peck (1995) , and Dana (2001) Manufacturers, denoted by i, simultaneously choose capacity levels k i to produce an identical medicine. After choosing capacities, each manufacturer is hit by a shock i which jointly follow a distribution whose CDF is G( ). Manufacturer i's new capacity is k i i .
There is a mass of size M of patients which are all willing to pay up to p max for the medicine.
Of those, M gov are insured by Medicare. Under cost based reimbursement (ASP), if the total capacity in the market after the shocks is less than the market size M , then the market price of the medicine is equal to p max . If the total installed capacity is greater than the market size M, then the price of the good is zero.
Under AWP reimbursement, the government which reimburses hospitals at p max no matter what the price the hospital purchased the medicine at when they serve Medicare patients. 11 The government purchases up to M gov units at p max no matter what total industry capacity turns out to be. Some fraction γ of that reimbursement rate will go to manufacturers. γ ∈ [0, 1] represents a bargaining power parameter which is assumed to be the same across manufacturers.
Under ASP, manufacturer i solves:
where the expectation is over the joint distribution of shocks to capacity. How much each manufacturer sells when total capacity is greater than the market size does not matter because price drops to zero when the industry is not capacity constrained and the marginal cost of production is zero up to the capacity constraint. Under AWP reimbursement, manufacturer i solves
where Q i is the quantity sold by manufacturer i. If total capacity is lower than market size ( i k i i < M ), then this is equal to manufacturer i's capacity. If the industry has more capacity 11 The manufacturers only receive the additional payment compared to the ASP regime on Medicare patients. than necessary to serve the whole market, the manufacturers split the Medicare market according to what fraction of total capacity they own. 12 We assume that manufacturers produce up to capacity and do not destroy any of their product even when the industry has over-produced. One could consider variations to this game that accounted for that type of behavior. For example, once shocks are realized, new capacities could be announced publicly followed by a simultaneous move game where each manufacturer decides how much quantity to supply to the market. Depending on the realization of the shocks, a single manufacturer may be large enough to unilaterally withhold enough quantity to avoid the market price falling to zero. Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) document this type of behavior in the California electricity generation industry. However, there will still be states of the world where this incentive does not exist, and Medicare's reimbursement under the AWP regime will affect investment incentives.
The incentive to invest in capacity is determined by integrating prices over the joint distribution of . Manufacturers must pay an entry cost F to produce and sell the good. The equilibrium number of firms is given by the maximum number of firms such that the variable profits of each firm are greater than F.
We find a symmetric Nash equilibrium to the simultaneous capacity choice sub-game. If the distribution of has no mass points, then the symmetric equilibrium capacity per firm when N firms are producing is the solution to the following equation under ASP:
where e N is the 1xN vector of ones. Under AWP reimbursement,
We use numerical simulation to show how equilibrium quantities vary with model parameters.
When γ > 0, equilibrium capacities and average prices are higher under AWP than ASP. Shortages occur less frequently under AWP than with ASP ( Figure 5 ). Whether total welfare is higher or lower is ambiguous. When a firm enters the industry, it does not capture the full social value of its investment, because competition drives average price below p max in some states of the world.
13
In the other direction, the government must raise the funds to pay for the AWP reimbursement, potentially distorting the decisions in some other area of the economy. Poorly designed AWP reimbursement can also lead to over-entry and over-investment in capacity.
The model's predictions for levels are not surprising. The AWP reimbursement continues to pay manufacturers for Medicare patients even when the industry over-produces. This implies higher returns to investing in capacity for manufacturers, thus more total capacity and fewer shortages.
The model is useful for empirical analysis because it predicts a differential impact of the AWP reimbursement depending on features of the drug. In particular, drugs with lower fixed costs and that serve more Medicare patients will experience a greater increase in shortages moving from AWP to acquisition cost based reimbursement as in ASP.
The contracts negotiated between health providers, wholesalers, and manufacturers are more complicated than the simple model put forth here. Contracts often have non-linearities due to bundled discounts or quantity discounts or other material clauses. Modeling the nexus of nonlinear contracts between strategic agents would be an important advance to the maintained model. However, it is unlikely that such a model would change the result that moving from AWP to ASP reimbursement decreases incentives to invest in capacity. This is because in such models of the nexus of linear contracts in other industries (for example Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) ) the price to the upstream firm, the manufacturer in this paper, will depend strongly on the surplus created by consumption of the good and competition. Non-linearities in the contracts may reduce or sharpen this dependence, but there is no theoretical basis that they would overturn the dependence. Since prices and demand for each product determine the incentives to invest in capacity, the simple model here captures the first-order determinants of these investment decisions.
Data
An observation is a drug and year. We refer to a drug as an active ingredient or combination of active ingredients. For example, the nutritional product Multiple Vitamins for Infusion (MVI) (1) It makes entry more desirable as there are more consumers for the medicine. However, it also means that the industry needs to produce more to satisfy demand which can make capacity investment less attractive depending on the shape of the cost of capacity function. When fixed costs increase, fewer firms enter. This leads to higher margins and more capacity investment in equilibrium. Finally, when the share of Medicare patients rises, capacity investment becomes more attractive in the AWP regime while it is unaffected in the ASP regime.
13 is a combination of active ingredients that also exist as stand-alone drugs. We only consider drugs whose route of administration is intravenous or injectable.
We use five data sources. which archives shortages that were reported to the FDA or the Association of Health System Pharmacists (ASHP) by providers (hospitals or pharmacists) or manufacturers. In the data, a drug shortage is defined as "a supply issue that affects how the pharmacy prepares or dispenses a drug product or influences patient care when prescribers must use an alternative agent" (Fox et al., 2009 given drug in a given year. Because the analysis is at the drug level, we collapse the observations of a given drug into one observation per year. The Orange Book does not track biological pharmaceuticals which are made by a biological process rather than chemical synthesis (e.g. insulin). These drugs have a more complicated manufacturing process and have been subject to some shortages.
Most biologicals are still on patent. This paper focuses on chemically-synthesized compounds which make up the majority of administered drugs.
14 An alternative set of vaccine shortage data are offered by the FDA. The FDA uses a stricter definition of a shortage than the UUDIS. However, historical FDA data are not available. The UUDIS measures of shortages are widely used in the pharmaceutical literature Fox et al. (2009); Fox, Sweet and Jensen (2014) . 15 Approved products whose manufacturers no longer actively market the product are listed as "discontinued" in the Orange Book. The number of manufacturers variable we construct from the Orange Book only counts active manufacturers.
Medicare Market Share (MMS)
MMS is the fraction of a drug's revenue from Medicare Part B. We use MMS to identify which drugs will be more impacted by the Medicare reimbursement change. Hence, for MMS, cardinality is not particularly important, but ordinality is.
We use two estimates of MMS. For both measures, the numerator is Medicare Part B sales to physicians. These were the only sales directly affected by the policy change of switching to ASP pricing. 16 The two MMS measures vary according to the denominator: total drug revenue.
In the first measure of MMS, the denominator is the sum of revenue for each drug from the IMS database. In the second measure of MMS, the denominator is the sum of revenues for each drug in the MarketScan database plus the revenues to Medicare Part B. As we discuss in section 4.1, we use an instrumental variables strategy to address this measurement error.
Sample Definition
To combine these data sources, we begin with all HCPCS codes beginning with J ("HCPCS We join this set of drugs to the shortage data by year, active ingredient(s), and route of administration, keeping all unmatched observations. If an observation from the matched set of drugs with HCPCS code J does not match to any shortage observation, we record that drug as not having shortages in the period of the sample. We join these data to the collapsed FDA Orange Book by 18 Missing sales to other settings is less of concern because most drugs get most of their revenue from one setting. For example, a drug mostly used in retail would not usually have large sales in a hospital setting.
19 Codes J0000 -J0849 indicates "Drugs other than Chemotherapy" and Codes J8521 to J9000 indicate "Chemotherapy Drugs." 20 The average HCPCS J code contains 15.12 10-digit National Drug Code (NDC) codes. 21 The Orange Book does not cover biologics, vaccines, and some nutritional products that did not require FDA approval. active ingredient(s) and route of administration and year, keeping only matched observations. In addition to the HCPCS J code drugs which don't appear in the Orange and route of administration combinations which never manifest in the MarketScan data. These are nearly all on patent at some point in the sample period, and so do not affect the major results of the paper.
25

Empirical Analysis
We begin by using a differences-in-differences identification strategy to show that drugs that had greater exposure to the Medicare policy change, measured using the Medicare market share (MMS), had the greatest increases in shortages (section 4.1). Ultimately, our model suggests that shortages result from reduced manufacturer's prices, which we hypothesize results from lower reimbursements to providers. We show that reduced reimbursement to providers, caused by the 22 There are seven such HCPCS J codes. These drugs all were matched by ingredient, but the indicated route of administration does not exist in the Orange Book.
23 These are the majority of all drugs, such as prescription tablets taken at home. 24 Because of data availability, the matching begins in 2004. 25 We also ran the analysis assigning this subset of drugs an MMS of 1 and a degenerate age distribution at 60. The results of the paper are not sensitive to this assignment. policy change, is correlated with increased shortages (section 4.2). Then consistent with our prediction that reduced incentives to manufacturers would lead to more shortages, we show that lower prices to manufacturers are correlated with more shortages (section 4.3). Following the discussion of vertical markets with bargaining power on each side (section 1.2), we show that lower reimbursements to providers are correlated with lower manufacturer's prices (section 4.4).
Throughout this section the unit of analysis is a drug and year. We log Medicare market share because the observed distribution of MMS is skewed. Similarly, we log prices throughout the analysis. To reduce noise in the measure of the Medicare market share, and because the sample period for the IMS data is shorter than the whole sample, we average across years to get compute one measure for each drug. Formally, this is modeled as:
Shortages Conditional on Medicare Market Share
Shortage it is the number of shortage days in year t. α i and δ t are drug and year fixed effects, which control for time-invariant differences across drugs, including the main effect of log(M M S i ), and a general time trend. Then, assuming parallel trends without treatment, β is the treatment effect -the extra shortage days caused by having higher MMS post-regulation. 1(OffP atent it ) is an indicator for whether that drug and year observation was off patent. We classify a drug as off patent if it has been at least 15 years since the molecule was approved.
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As discussed in (Section 3.1) we are concerned about error in our measures of MMS. Under the assumption of classical measurement error, the coefficient on the interaction term, β, will be attenuated towards zero. We therefore employ instrumental variables to deal with the measurement error. Because we ultimately interact MMS with the ASP reimbursement dummy variable, we follow the suggestion in Procedure 21.1 of Wooldridge (2010) We then run a number of falsification tests and robustness checks. First, if drugs with higher Medicare market shares were experiencing an increase in shortages prior to the policy change, then the coefficient estimate would be misinterpreted as evidence that the policy change had led to an increase in shortages. We assess whether such an effect exists by running the same specification as In addition, we use a flexible difference-in-difference method to see whether there are pre-trend effects and observe the dynamics of the treatment effect over time. This is modeled as:
where Y ear t are indicators for each year, that is interacted with the MMS which is constant across years.
26 This is consistent with Grabowski, Long and Mortimer (2014) who found that, for drugs experiencing initial generic entry between 2000 and 2012, the mean time since launch (which usually follows a few months after approval) was about 13 years with a standard deviation of about 3 years. Our results are not sensitive to varying the threshold from 15 to 12 or 18. 27 The MarketScan data covers patients who are under 65. The logic is that if the drugs are taken by older patients in the MarketScan data, then they are more likely to be taken by Medicare patients as well.
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As shown in the model, because of their lower margins, off patent drugs should be more affected by the change to ASP than on patent drugs. To test this, we interact an indicator for patent-status with an indicator for post-regulation status. Then, we interact those indicators with Medicare market share to test whether the importance of Medicare is largest for the off patent drugs. This is modeled as:
where P eriod t × 1(P atent Status it ) is the cross product of period (pre and post-regulation) and patent status (on and off).
Shortages Conditional on Reimbursements to Health Providers
Previously, we discussed why declining reimbursements to providers would affect a manufacturer's profit (section 1.2). In this section, provide indirect evidence of this effect, by checking whether the reduced reimbursements to providers increase the rate of shortages. Under the assumption that a majority of the variation in price was due to the policy change (see figure 3 ), then most of the variation in price can be considered exogenous which allows us to use OLS. The specification we use is:
where Reimbursement per service it is the mean reimbursement (revenue divided by quantity)
by Medicare in year t for drug i. In practice, this should be similar to the AWP or ASP during the respective reimbursement regimes. Drugs which go into shortage experience increases in price which translate into increased Medicare reimbursements after 2005 with ASP based reimbursement. Therefore, the OLS regression will underestimate the effect of drug prices that have risen in response to shortage. To control for this we use one-year lagged reimbursement values to control for this effect of shortages on prices.
We also condition on the patent-status (1(P atent Status it )) since it plays important roles in the theory. Finally, α i and δ t are drug and time fixed effects.
One possible worry in this regression is that unobservable demand shocks are driving both prices and shortages. However, a positive demand shock would lead to higher prices and more shortages, holding supply fixed. This biases the estimates in the opposite direction of what we ultimately find, which is that higher prices are correlated with fewer shortages.
Shortages Conditional on Manufacturer's Prices
In the previous section, we analyzed changes in shortage frequency with variation in reimbursements to health care providers. While the law directly affected reimbursements to providers, our model suggests that shortages depend on manufacturers' incentives. In this section, we analyze the effect of manufacturer's prices on shortages. To do this, we use the IMS data, which measures wholesale prices. Similar to section 4.2, we regress shortages on the price manufacturers receive.
We also try lagged price to control for shortages raising prices of drugs. Formally, the specification we use is:
Because the Medicare market is a smaller portion of the market, overall price changes may not be solely determined by the MMA. However, as discussed above, there is evidence that private insurers followed Medicare into ASP pricing. If private insurers did this without any lag, then we could again think of price changes as exogenous. Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate the identifying variation. In particular, there were considerable price declines for the most expensive high MMS drugs, those that were most likely to have inflated AWP and where the reduced reimbursement would affect the largest share of sales by the manufacturer. 
Correlation in Payments to Providers and Manufacturers
As discussed in (section 1.2) the mechanism relies on the assumption that the manufacturer's prices were reduced for drugs where the reimbursement to providers was reduced. To test this assumption, we regress the Medicare reimbursement per service, a measure of reimbursement to providers, on the IMS price, a measure of manufacturer's prices. Also, to show that this effect is strongest for drugs where Medicare plays a larger role, we interact the MMS with the Medicare reimbursements. Formally, this is modelled as:
log(IM S P rice it ) = β 0 + δ t + β 1 log(Reimbursement per service it ) (6)
Results
The top panel of Table 1 gives summary statistics for the main sample -all drugs which we were able to merge with IMS data. Table 13 in the appendix gives summary statistics for all the drugs with Medicare reimbursement data, a sample which is used in some specifications when the IMS data are not used. There are 256 drugs in the main sample. The lower panel gives summary statistics for off and on-patent drug year observations separately. The average time that a drug is in shortage was 60 days (unconditional on being in shortage), but was 79 days and 9 days for offand on-patent drugs, respectively. 72 percent of drug-year observations are off-patent. The average number of manufacturers for an off-patent drug is 3.54. Using the IMS data, the average MMS is 0.09 and using the MarketScan data the average MMS is 0.14. Table 2 presents the difference-and-differences relationship between shortages and Medicare market share. Columns (1) and (2) OLS and IV give the estimates without age in the instrument set. Because the specification has year indicators, we have differenced out the time-trend in the results. The OLS estimate of β is 5.7, while the IV estimate is 6.6. As expected, the IV estimate is larger due to the correction of measurement error. The results imply that an increase in the MMS from the mean of .09 to .1 leads to a 0.63 and .73 day increase in the number of shortage days, for the OLS and IV estimates, respectively. Column (3) is a robustness check where we include age and age-squared in the instrument set. Column (4) and (5) Table 3 gives the initial first stage result, where we regress the log of IMS MMS on the instrument set. Table 4 gives the first-stage in the main regression, where the interaction of predicted MMS with the ASP reimbursement dummy serves as an instrument for log of IMS MMS interacted with the ASP reimbursement. In each table, column (1) uses the log of IMS MMS as the endogenous variable and the log of MarketScan MMS as the instrument, (2) includes age and age-squared in the instrument set and (3) uses the log of MarketScan MMS as the endogenous variable and the log of IMS MMS as the instrument. For the initial first stage, the F-statistic is well above 10, the usual rule of thumb for instrument relevance in each specification.
Results for Shortages Conditional on Medicare Market Share
In Table 5 , we check the impact of the definition of an off-patent drug. We vary the years since first approval we use to define a drug as off-patent from 18 years in columns (1) and (2), 12 years in columns (3) and (4), and 2 years in columns (5) and (6). Furthermore, unlike our standard definition of off-patent, we do not redefine drugs with multiple manufacturers as off-patent as well.
The odd columns are OLS results while the even numbered columns are IV results. Changing the patent variable leads to differences in the OLS estimate of the treatment effect from 5.5 to 5.7 and the IV estimate of the treatment effect from 6.2 to 6.8. In summary, we find the that varying the patent status variable within reason matters little for our coefficients of interest.
If drugs with higher Medicare market shares were experiencing an increase in shortages prior to the policy change, then the coefficient estimate would be misinterpreted as evidence that the policy change led to an increase in shortages. Table 6 loses statisitical significance. Likewise, the IV coefficient falls from 6.6 to 2.6 and loses statistical significance as well. These results suggest in the pre-period, the parallel trends assumption holds, a check that is often used in the literature to justify the parallel trends-assumption during the sample period.
To better understand how the effects of MMS change overtime, Table 7 Finally, since our theoretical model suggests that the MMA should impact off-patent drugs more than on-patent drugs with higher margins, we interact the patent indicator with pre and post regulation indicators and the MMS measure. Column (1) and (2) of Table 8 shows the OLS and IV estimates, respectively. The OLS coefficient estimate for off patent, post-regulation is 25 -suggesting that on average off-patent drugs in the post regulation period experience 25 days more of shortage than on patent drugs, prior to the regulation. The coefficient for off-patent, postregulation interacted with the MMS of suggests that an off-patent drug with an MMS of .1 would have .83 more average days of shortage than a drug with an MMS of .09, relative to the difference between a comparable set of drugs, with the same MMS difference, that are on-patent and in the pre-regulation period. This is much larger than the same effect for drugs on patent, post-regulation (coefficient of 2.0) or off-patent but before ASP (coefficient of .06). Column (3) and (4) of Table   8 provide a falsification test where we show the result using 2 years after earliest approval as the definition of off patent. The magnitudes of the coefficients are smaller (7.45 to 1 for the OLS, 8.24 to .31 for IV) and no longer significantly significant. While previous results provided evidence for the role of MMA in shortages, this table corroborates our theory that off-patent drugs should be most affected by MMA, which we hypothesize is due to low reimbursement. (1) and (2) are the OLS and IV estimates using the IMS MMS as the treatment variable, respectively. Column (3) includes age in the instrument set. Column (4) and (5) are the OLS and IV estimates using the MarketScan MMS as the treatment variable. Each regression contains molecule fixed effects and indicator variables for each year from 2002 to 2012. Column (4) has more observations because the MarketScan data had associated HCPCS codes which improved our matching compared to name matching. Stars indicate statistical significance: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01 Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the drug level. First step in IVs, OLS with log of MarketScan MMS as the independent variable and log of IMS MMS as the dependent variable. Column (1) is the single instrument case. Column (2) adds age instruments. Column (3) uses log of MarketScan MMS as the dependent variable and log of IMS MMS as the independent variable. Stars indicate statistical significance: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01 Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the drug level. This is table varies the years since earliest approval used as patent expiration. Columns (1) and (2) are the OLS and IV estimates with off-patent defined as 18 years since Orange Book earliest approval. Columns (3) and (4) are the OLS and IV estimates with off-patent defined as 12 years since Orange Book earliest approval. Columns (5) and (6) (1) and (2) are the OLS and IV estimates with off-patent defined as 15 years since Orange Book earliest approval. As a falsification test, columns (3) and (4) (1) and (2) are the OLS and 1-year lagged OLS estimates for all drugs. Off-patent defined as 15 years since Orange Book earliest approval. Columns (3) and (4) are the OLS and 1-year lagged estimates for drugs off-patent throughout the sample period. Columns (5) and (6) are the OLS and 1-year lagged estimates for drugs on-patent throughout the sample period. All regressions include year and ingredient fixed effects. Table 9 shows the results for shortages conditional on reimbursements to providers. Columns
Results for Shortages Conditional on Reimbursements to Health Providers
(1) and (2) show the log and lagged-log price coefficients. The coefficient on lagged price suggests that a 1 percent (roughly 55 cents per unit) decrease in price leads to .24 more shortage days.
Columns (3) and (4) show the same results keeping only drugs which were off-patent throughout the sample while columns (5) and (6) show the on patent results. Consistent with our theory, offpatent drugs were most affected by prices. The statistically significant coefficient on 1 year lag of log price for an off-patent drug of -28.34 suggests that a 1 percent decrease in price (roughly 33 cents per unit) leads to .28 more shortage days. The on-patent drugs' results were not statistically significant, which is consistent with our theory that these drugs had higher margins. The change in estimates moving from current price to the 1 year lagged price (−23.5 to −28.3) are consistent with correcting the downward bias caused by the reverse causality problem described above. Table 10 shows the results for shortages conditional on manufacturer's prices. Columns (1) and (2) show the log and lagged-log price coefficients. The coefficient on lagged price suggests 35 that a 1 percent (roughly 2.09 dollars per unit) decrease in price leads to .38 more shortage days.
Results for Shortages Conditional on Manufacturer's Prices
Columns (3) and (4) show the same results keeping only drugs which were off-patent throughout the sample while columns (5) and (6) show the on patent results. Again, off-patent drugs were most affected by prices. The statistically significant coefficient on 1 year lag of log price of -32.57
suggests that a 1 percent decrease in price (roughly 99 cents per unit) leads to .33 more shortage days. The on-patent drugs' results, as in the case with reimbursements to health providers, were not statistically significant. In summary it appears that lower prices to manufacturers are correlated with more shortages. (4) are the OLS and 1-year lagged estimates for drugs off-patent throughout the sample period. Columns (5) and (6) are the OLS and 1-year lagged estimates for drugs on-patent throughout the sample period. All regressions include year and ingredient fixed effects. gets by close to 4.1 percent near the maximum on MMS. This is suggestive of the magnitude of pass-through in reimbursement reductions from the law to manufacturers.
Results for Correlation in Payments to Providers and Manufacturers
Discussion
We provide evidence that higher reimbursement could reduce drug shortages. A 10% increase in Medicare reimbursement for an off-patent drug is associated with 2.8 fewer days of shortage (Table 9) . A 10% increase on all off-patent drugs is about $3.27 per service (Table 1) Table 14 in the Appendix, we show that the main regression results hold within the sample of lower price generic drugs as defined by prices below the median. 30 The total cost to society depends on how private payment reacts as well. If private payment follows Medicare reimbursement, then it would be more expensive. In fact, not all private insurers changed and even those that changed did not move all the way down to ASP plus 6%, so the cost would be less than $750 million.
The Medicare reimbursement change created an approximately 50% decline in prices which would create 15 days of shortage. The mean days of shortage are 60, so about 25% of shortage days are due to the Medicare reimbursement change.
Other factors may also be associated with drug shortages. First, declining drug prices resulted not only from Medicare changes, but also from the expansion of 340B pricing (as discussed in section 1.1). However, the scale of the 340B program is much smaller than the scale of Medicare. Second, industry consolidation could cause shortages. However, consolidation among manufacturers has ambiguous effects. Consolidation could make shortages less likely as consolidation increases market power and margins. Alternatively, depending on the covariance of shocks to manufacturing lines of different firms, consolidation could lead to increased shortages. Third, shortages could be caused by grey market distributors and stockpiling by hospitals. However, these practices are relatively rare and are symptoms of shortages, rather than causes. Finally, increased FDA regulatory scrutiny appears to be associated with drug shortages (Stomberg, 2015) . However, some of this increased scrutiny could be a reaction to less investment in reliability by the manufacturers. Nevertheless, the aforementioned factors may be complementary hypotheses but are not valid competing hypothesis. It would have to be the case that, for example, the FDA increased scrutiny after the policy change disproportionately on generic drugs which served more Medicare patients.
The policy change was implemented in 2005, but shortages did not become large until 2009.
However, the empirical analysis shows an increase in shortages for drugs with higher MMS starting in 2006. Furthermore, as described in section 1.1, private insurers are known to mimic Medicare with a lag. Finally, some manufacturers probably continued to produce these low-margin drugs until other opportunities arose, such as following a large wave of patent expirations in 2007.
The generic sterile injectable markets shares several features with electricity generation which has faced similar issues. First, timing is critical, because delays can be costly to patient health.
Likewise, electricity supply and demand must be in equilibrium at each instant to avoid power system failures. Second, storage is costly. Sterile injectables are sensitive to light and temperature.
Likewise, storing electricity by battery or with hydro-storage is currently considered prohibitively costly in most cases. Third, there is little product differentiation, so price competition can be fierce.
The solution in electricity generation has been a mixture of rapid price adjustment and government regulation. Details on how electricity markets deal with shortages are in Cramton and Stoft (2005) .
Conclusion
We examine how a reduction in reimbursement to health providers was passed to manufacturers and played a role in the large increase in shortages of generic sterile injectable drugs. Drugs that were more affected by the change in policy experienced a greater increase of shortages. The drugs that were more affected were drugs which treat diseases with older patient populations, because Medicare predominantly covers older patients. While Medicare reimbursement can not directly explain the full increase in shortages, the evidence is consistent with a theoretical model in which declining Medicare reimbursement decreases the returns to investing in capacity and leading to an increased level of shortages.
To alleviate the shortage problem, Medicare could increase reimbursements. Indeed, both the theoretical model and the empirical results suggest that firms with market power (and thus higher prices) tend to invest more in capacity and have fewer shortages. However, there is a tension between creating market power and high prices, and having fewer shortages. The optimal number of shortages is clearly not zero if it requires extremely high prices.
Contracts could also reduce drug shortages. In theory, if contracts imposed harsh penalties on manufacturers for failure to supply, then stock outs would fall and average prices would rise. In practice, harsh penalties have been considered difficult to enforce. Indeed, while contracts might include "failure to supply" clauses, the contracts usually void the penalty in case of nationwide shortages (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). Furthermore, contracts might be difficult to enforce due to information asymmetries or gaming. Another concern with contracts is that they might induce shortages. If the buyer does not receive sufficient supply from the seller, then the seller must pay a penalty. This might motivate the buyer to hoard and create a shortage.
Alternatively, competing sellers might want to hoard to create a shortage and then supply the product when price rises. Because the shortage problem is relatively recent, contracts might not have had sufficient time to be refined to account for these outcomes. Furthermore, perhaps FDA could be a party to the contracts. FDA could condition approval on maintaining sufficient supply, and require extensive notification before discontinuing production. Indeed, the Food and Drug Figure 9 : Price levels and changes for IMS drugs. These graphs are for the entire sample of drugs. The left is the distribution of the price level for IMS. The right panel is the distribution of price changes for IMS. Each year, the price change is calculated as the price in year t minus the price in year t − 1, divided by the price in year t − 1, for each drug. The graph shows the percentiles of those values. All percentiles are calculated without weights across drugs. (1) and (2) are the OLS and IV estimates using the IMS MMS in levels, rather than logs, as the treatment variable, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) are use log of MMS again, but only include drugs whose median price is below the sample median drug price. Each regression contains molecule fixed effects and indicator variables for each year from 2002 to 2012. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the drug level. This is the first-stage in 2SLS where the instrument is predicted MMS from Table 15 interacted with ASP Reimbursement. Column (1) runs both MMS measures in levels rather than logs. Column (2) is in logs, but only includes drugs whose median price is below the sample median drug price. Each regression also contains indicator variables for each year from 2002 to 2012, which are omitted from the table.
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